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ABSTRACT PAGE

The peltry trade in Virginia and New Netherland w as a response to a significant decline in
skins and furs from Muscovy during the seventeenth century. Overhunting of furbearing
animals in this region led to a decline in supply, and subsequently the dem and for peltry
allowed New World m arkets to becom e ever more important. This thesis com pares the fur
trade in the English-settled colony of Virginia and the Dutch colony of New Netherland to
illuminate broader conclusions about the North American peltry exchange, involving
Europeans and their Indian neighbors. The second half of the seventeenth century is the
focus for the deerskin trade in Virginia, a s this period encom passes the successful peltry
business of William Byrd I and his uncle, the apex of Anglo-Algonquian violence during
Bacon’s Rebellion, and the infringement of South Carolina in the C hesapeake deerskin market.
The beaver fur trade in New Netherland began decades before the C hesapeake trade. The
period from 1634-1667 is examined for the Dutch fur trade, a s this timeframe encom passes
Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s journey into Mohawk territory, likely the first Dutch
exploration to the Mohawk homeland, up to the English takeover of the colony.
Anglo-Algonquian interactions w ere marked by more violence and hostility than relations
between Dutch colonists and the Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk; why this w as the c a se is
the singular question this thesis strives to answer. The Dutch-Mohawk alliance w as relatively
peaceful, and no w ars ever occurred between the New Netherland colonists and this native
group similar to Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia.
European-lndian fur trading relations in Virginia and New Netherland w ere overall starkly
dissimilar because of the dynamics of their exchanges, ac ce ss to skins and furs, and outside
forces beyond European control. Land encroachment, European competition in the fur trade,
and mutual protection are important them es in addressing the divergent peltry trade models in
the C hesapeake and New Netherland. This c a se study suggests that when the fur trade w as
not mutually beneficial to the Europeans and Indians involved, conflict followed. The
Europeans a s well a s the Indians sought to exploit each other, with the Europeans gaining
lucrative skins and furs to export overseas and the Indians obtaining guns, ironware, duffel,
and other desirable wares. The Indians w ere engaged in m erchant capitalism a s much a s the
European colonists with whom they traded their peltry.
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INTRODUCTION
BUILDING A COLONY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were marked by European exploration
and the discovery of new lands, peoples, and resources from the Far East, Africa, and
North America.1 In the early seventeenth century, Spain was the leader in the
colonization of the New World, conquering native peoples and acquiring raw materials to
benefit the metropole. Spain’s riches from its New World endeavors led other European
powers, such as England and the Netherlands, to plant colonies in North America, Yet,
Spain’s wealth, Catholicism, and violent interactions with Native Americans confirmed
the hatred England and the Netherlands felt towards their European neighbor,
encouraging new approaches to settlement. The colonization practices the English and
the Dutch developed in Virginia and New Netherland, respectively, retained a central
aspect of Spain’s conquistador model: profit. Virginia and New Netherland were part of
a colonial Atlantic world in which the establishment of settlements for the metropole
initially lacked permanence and cohesion. The goal was revenue, and therefore the “get
rich quick” system of extracting raw materials from the New World and returning to
Europe was the very definition of colonization in the early seventeenth century.
The profitability of New World colonies was largely reliant on trade: between the
colony and the metropole, between the colonists and native peoples, and between and
within the colonies themselves. Prior to the establishment of permanent settlements and
towns in North America, which brought some stability to colonial life, survival was
1 James Horn, A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth o f America (New York: Basic Books,
2005), 11.

1

almost entirely dependent on these forms of exchange. Most importantly, the colonists
needed the natives to provide them with subsistence crops, as the colonists did not have
ample supplies of food leftover from their voyages at sea. The settlers also needed the
natives to teach them the skills o f hunting and planting in a foreign environment. Trade
with North America’s native populations, both in goods and know-how, was essential to
the survival of European colonies in the New World. In telling the story of colonization
in North America, trade is a central theme, and it is therefore the motivation of the
narrative which follows.
This thesis compares the fur trade in Virginia and New Netherland to illuminate
broader conclusions about the North American peltry exchange, involving Europeans and
their Indian neighbors. The second half of the seventeenth century is the focus for the
deerskin trade in Virginia, as this period encompasses the successful peltry business of
William Byrd and his uncle, the apex of Anglo-Algonquian violence during Bacon’s
Rebellion, and the infringement of South Carolina in the Chesapeake deerskin market.
The fur trade in New Netherland began decades before the Chesapeake trade. The period
from 1634-1667 is the focus for the Dutch fur trade, as this timeframe includes Harmen
Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s journey into Mohawk territory, likely the first Dutch
exploration to the Mohawk homeland, up to the English takeover of the colony. I will
argue that Anglo-Algonquian interactions were marked by more violence and hostility
than relations between Dutch colonists and the Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk. The
Dutch-Mohawk alliance was relatively peaceful, and no wars ever occurred between the
New Netherland colonists and this native group. European-Indian fur trading relations in
2

Virginia and New Netherland were overall starkly dissimilar because o f the dynamics of
their exchanges, access to skins and furs, and outside forces beyond European control.
This case study suggests that when the fur trade was not mutually beneficial to the
Europeans and Indians involved, conflict followed. The Europeans, as well as the
Indians, sought to exploit each other, with the Europeans gaining lucrative skins and furs
to export overseas and the Indians obtaining guns, ironware, duffel, and other desirable
wares.
Historians have conducted substantial scholarship on North America’s English
colonies, emphasizing America’s foundations in purely English terms. In addition,
scholars have focused heavily on a comparison between the model of colonization
employed in New England and the model established in Virginia in an attempt to locate a
normative settlement practice from which American culture is derived. The New
England-Virginia comparison has also been of interest in examining the divergent
developments of the North and the South as a response to colonization. This thesis shifts
the focus away from a purely Anglo-American narrative, which has been exhausted in the
historiography. Instead, this comparison sheds light on the colonization practices of two
of Europe’s most similar nations, England and the Netherlands, both of whom were
heavily engaged in the North American fur trade.
This comparison between Virginia and New Netherland is significant because
England and the Netherlands were the only two Protestant nations in Europe during this
period; both were trade-oriented, maritime, and had a mutual hatred for the Spanish,
which influenced their overseas ventures. Trade was central to conflicts between the
3

Dutch and the English during the seventeenth century. There is evidence that the
colonists at Jamestown and New Netherland had contact with each other and traded
goods along the eastern seaboard. The colonists’ interactions with different Indian
peoples under unique environmental constraints, contributed to distinct European-Indian
relations in these colonies. Why Anglo-Algonquian and Dutch-Iroquois relations
differed primarily in the second half of the seventeenth century is the question this thesis
strives to answer by examining the peltry trade as a case study.
Scholars have neglected a comparative history of Jamestown and New Netherland
in favor of comparing English colonies throughout the Atlantic world. There are likely
two reasons for this; the first involves a language barrier and the second concerns the
English conquest o f New Netherland. Colonial Dutch studies are still in their infancy, in
comparison to colonial Virginia narratives, because there is only a small minority of
scholars who can translate the seventeenth-century Dutch documents necessary to write
an accurate history of the colony. Many colonial Dutch documents have been lost to
history, and some have been difficult to locate in the archives. The work of Dr. Charles
T. Gehring and his staff at the New Netherland Institute in Albany, New York in
translating and publishing seventeenth-century Dutch documents has furthered the study
of New Netherland. Moreover, his guidebook is cited by many Dutch historians, and his
translations have been used by scholars interested in writing about the colony, including
this graduate student. In addition to the language barrier, historians have shied away
from writing a history of New Netherland in favor of studying English New York, as the
English conquered the Dutch colony officially in 1667. However, English control of the
4

colony did not significantly alter the lives o f the Dutch colonists, as their political
institutions and laws were in large part retained. As opposed to reducing the colonization
of New Netherland to a history of English New York, this thesis aligns with more recent
scholarship in studying New Netherland as a value in and of itself.
Archaeological evidence has only recently shown how connected Jamestown and
New Netherland were via trade. While addressing English-Dutch trade in North America
may seem to be wandering from the main argument, discussing Jamestown and New
Netherland as part of an Atlantic system of trade between England and the Netherlands
further emphasizes the significance o f this comparison and the interconnectedness of the
two colonies. One of the most definitive ways to place Jamestown and New Netherland
in an interdependent, Atlantic trade network is via the extent of the EB pipe trade. The
Edward Bird pipe factory was located in Amsterdam, Netherlands, circa 1635-1665,
hence the “EB” denoted on the pipe stems found by archaeologists in many seventeenthcentury colonial settlements. EB pipe stems have been found not only at Jamestown and
New Netherland but also in Brazil, the Caribbean, New England, New France, New
Sweden, and Maryland. While historians have often focused on studying colonies as
separate entities, archaeology has proven that colonization was not an independent action
involving one people and one location, and the EB pipe trade is a quintessential example
of this. Interestingly, Edward Bird was bom an Englishman and moved to Amsterdam as
a response to the political upheaval in England during the reign of Charles I. He died in
Amsterdam in 1665, having participated fully in Dutch commerce via his pipe making
business and investing in New Netherland in 1646. It is not exceptional that Bird, a
5

Puritan, would have found refuge in the Netherlands considering that Amsterdam and
Leiden were havens for Puritans escaping religious oppression in England. Bird’s pipe
making business and the extent of the EB pipe export market offers a fresh look at how
colonies around the Atlantic intersected through trade. This trade good also confirms
exchange between the English and the Dutch in the New World.
The construction of EB pipes suggests that Mohawk Indians in New Netherland
were participating in this trade. Bird used 34 different pipe molds to meet the needs of
his diverse customers around the Atlantic world, which shows that he had some
knowledge of the peoples living in these distant places. This awareness of consumer
desires was probably derived from letters and people traveling to and from the colony and
the metropole. Pipes found at Fort Orange in New Netherland by Paul R. Huey, for
example, were modeled after Native American patterns, suggesting that the Dutch
colonists were modifying their orders from the metropole to meet the desires of their
Indian customers. The adaptation of EB pipes proves an understanding and knowledge of
other places outside Bird’s Amsterdam workshop and also the connection between the
English, Dutch, and native peoples in North America. The EB pipe trade was not only
encompassing European consumers but also Native Americans, illustrating the
transmission and translation of culture. Jamestown and New Netherland were, in some
sense, cosmopolitan as they were players in a vast Atlantic trade network.4

2 David A. Furlow, “Jamestown, Edward Bird, pipe maker and Dutch trade with Virginia” (presented at the
annual Jamestown Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia, November 10,2010).
3 Ibid.
4 According to David A. Furlow, at the time of Bird’s death, his estate catalogued 465,000 pipes in a pre
industrial society.
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David A. Furlow’s compilation of archaeological evidence suggests that Dutch
f-u

merchants were involved in trading with Virginia in the early 17 century,

. .buying

tobacco and selling pipes, pottery, furniture, horses, and slaves.”5 Furlow’s presentation
at the annual Jamestown Conference in 2010 emphasized that the Dutch were carrying
large quantities of tobacco from Jamestown to sell in Europe, especially during the
English Civil War. The extent to which the Dutch were involved in trade with
Jamestown is reflected in Virginia’s opposition to Parliament’s Navigation Act of
October 1651, which upset the Jamestown colonists as it “ ...limited their trade with the
/r

Dutch and New Netherland.” Furlow also underscored the relationship between
Virginia’s Governor Berkeley and New Netherland’s Director-General Peter Stuyvesant,
n

who corresponded with one another. Another important connection is Governor George
Yeardley’s links to the Dutch. Yeardley was the governor of Jamestown from 1619 to
1621, yet he was a military veteran who had fought for Holland during his teenage years.
Yeardley was also accused of treason against the English for trading with the Dutch.8 In
a comparative thesis involving Jamestown and New Netherland, the links between these
two colonies, particularly in terms of an Atlantic trade network, cannot be overlooked.
The connection between England, the Netherlands, and their North American
colonies was also manifested in Dutch artwork. For example, Pieter van Anraadt’s Still

5 Furlow, “Jamestown, Edward Bird, pipe maker and Dutch trade with Virginia.”
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Charles Hodges and Will Moore, “‘for ye defense of ye place’- State Salvage of Sir George Yeardley’s
Fort and Moat, Conservation of Pooley’s Parsonage or Piersey’s Manor at Flowerdew (all ca. 1619-1632)”
(presented at the annual Jamestown Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia, November 10, 2010).
7

Life with Stoneware Jug and Pipes (1658)9 shows a Dutch drinking vessel, similar to
those found by archaeologists working at James Fort, as well as tobacco, likely grown in
the Chesapeake. The painting features four pipes, which archaeology has proven was a
product transported throughout the Atlantic world. This piece of art is not exceptional, as
other Dutch artists, such as Hubert van Ravestyn, were painting similar scenes. The
connection between the English and the Dutch in terms of trade was observed by many
Englishmen and Dutchmen in the colonies and in the metropole, regardless o f social
class. It is highly likely that the trade network between England, the Netherlands,
Jamestown, and New Netherland, impacted the lives of many more people than simply
those transported to North America. From the colonist to the merchant to the dual
nationality merchant to the consumer of Chesapeake tobacco and Dutch pipes who had
never traveled across the Atlantic, the English-Dutch connection was real and part of
everyday life.

9 “Pieter van Anraadt - Still life with earthenware jug and pipes,” in Mauritshuis, The Hague, The Royal
Picture Gallery Mauritshuis, 2006, http://www.mauritshuis.nl/index.aspx?FilterId=988&ChapterId=
2346&ContentId= 17423. This painting is featured in David Furlow’s presentation slide #3.
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JAMESTOWN AND NEW NETHERLAND: INITIAL SETTLEMENT
When the English colonists landed at Jamestown Island in 1607, supported by the
Virginia Company, their goal was to extract natural resources from the New World for
export to the mother country. The settlement erected at James Fort was never intended to
be permanent. The gentlemen who traveled to the colony in its initial years lacked the
skills and know-how to create a working colonization model, and the colonists were
forced to rely on Powhatan expertise and com to survive in this foreign environment.
Relations between the colonists and the Chesapeake natives seem to have been tense
from the beginning of contact. J. Frederick Fausz argued that as early as 1609, the
beginning of the First Anglo-Powhatan War, the colonists and the natives were engaged
in violent conflict. Both groups were ethnocentric and competed for dominance in their
trade dealings. The First Anglo-Powhatan War was the beginning of many violent
clashes between the Europeans and Native Americans. This first war initiated combat as
the primary means in which the colonists and the natives defended themselves and their
identities.10 The English came to the New World to make a profit, and without
considering their interference on native ways of life, the settlers attempted to do just that.
The colonists searched for gold, struggled to produce glass, and grew mulberry trees to
encourage silk production, for examples, yet none of these ventures proved successful.
Jamestown’s unbalanced sex ratio also contributed to the settlement’s initial instability
and militaristic quality as the nuclear family was virtually nonexistent. In 1635, the
emigrant population to Virginia was eighty-four percent male, this after almost thirty

10 J. Frederick Fausz, “An ‘Abundance of Bloodshed on Both Sides’: England’s First Indian War, 16091614,” The Virginia Magazine o f History and Biography 98, no. 1 (January, 1990): 8, 54.
9

years since the first Englishmen settled the Chesapeake.11 The colonists also suffered
from a high mortality rate due to the seasoning process. In contrast to the colder climate
in New Netherland, which tended to be healthier for newcomers, the Virginia
environment retarded natural increase until the late seventeenth century.

10

The early

years of settlement were marked by disorder. The Virginia Company and the Englishmen
on the ground attempted to establish a functioning, profitable colony in the New World
with little prior experience to base their trials and efforts on.
Jamestown discovered its economic niche when John Rolfe’s tobacco
experiments proved successful. By 1619, tobacco cultivated in the Chesapeake was
exported to Europe, and the colony became a boomtown. Jamestown’s tobacco
monoculture, accessible to a large population of Virginia landholders prior to 1660, led to
colonial encroachment on native land, directly threatening the Powhatan way of life.13
Tobacco was ultimately an export crop that did not require a working relationship with
the natives to cultivate or sell the stinking weed. Tobacco was also more accessible than
the trade in deerskin, which became profitable at mid-century due to changes in shipping
costs. Fur trading licenses in the Chesapeake were restricted to Governor Berkley’s
favored colonists, and therefore most English settlers could not enter this trade. This
limited access to the deerskin export market motivated Bacon’s Rebellion, which was not
only a royalist uprising but also a war against particular Indian groups for deerskin. The
mutual benefits of trade between the English colonists and the Indians ceased to exist

11 Alison Games, Migration and the Origins o f the English Atlantic World (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1999), 83.
12 Ibid., 84.
13After 1660, Virginia society became increasingly closed to upward mobility.
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when tobacco became a cash crop at Jamestown and the trade in deerskin became
increasingly restrictive.
While the English colonists at Jamestown did not have a profitable export trade in
mind when they settled in the Chesapeake, the peltry market motivated the planting of a
Dutch settlement at New Netherland in 1614 by the West India Company (WIC). The
Dutch knew that valuable natural resources, including beaver furs, existed in New
Netherland after Henry Hudson’s voyages in the early seventeenth century. Like
Jamestown, the colony was initially a fortified settlement populated with Company men
at Fort Nassau and later Fort Orange; in New Netherland, these men were heavily
involved in the fur trade. While a faction of the WIC preferred to diversify the colony’s
exports for greater profit, growing wheat and tobacco, these crops did not produce a
boomtown. According to Adriaen van der Donck’s A Description o f New Netherland, an
account of the landscape, resources, and natives in the colony published in 1655 and
1656, the Dutch colony was established for the prosperity of the Netherlands. Van der
Donck described the metals and minerals found in the region, including gold, reminiscent
of the Jamestown colonists’ search for this soft metal.14 Despite all of the profitable
resources Van der Donck believed New Netherland could offer, such as agricultural crops
and wine, the beaver was the most important commodity in the region. According to the
Dutchman, “...the beaver is the main reason and the source of the means for the initial
settlement o f this fine country by Europeans.. ..”15 Like Jamestown, New Netherland was

14 Adriaen van der Donck, A Description o f New Netherland, ed. Charles T. Gehring and William A.
Stama, trans. Diederik Willem Goedhuys (Lincoln, Nebraska: University o f Nebraska Press, 2008), 38.
15 Ibid., 115.
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a for-profit venture, and Van der Donck emphasized (and exaggerated) the colony’s
resources and trade possibilities to entice his Dutch readership to cross the ocean.
In contrast to the peltry market in Virginia, the trade in beaver furs in New
Netherland constituted the settlement’s leading export commodity and was accessible to
Dutch colonists by 1640. The Chesapeake’s leading export crop, tobacco, infringed upon
native land, eliminating the need for working relations between the English and the
Powhatan. Yet, both colonies relied on the natives for food in the initial years of
settlement, particularly maize. It is probable that the fur trade pacified Dutch-Iroquois
relations for much of the colony’s existence, a point emphasized by William A. Stama.
Interestingly, when the Mohawk were engaged in war with the Mahican, Dutchman
Daniel van Crieckenbeeck, the commander of Fort Orange, fought against the Mohawk in
1626. As a result, the fur trade diminished at Fort Orange, and Dutchman Pieter Barentsz
was sent to defuse the conflict with the Indians. No records exist that the Dutch and the
Mohawk went to war over the van Crieckenbeeck incident or at any other time in the
colony’s history. The Mohawk-Mahican conflict may have reduced the threat of the
Mohawk waging war against the Dutch.16
The relatively peaceful relations between the Mohawk and the Dutch were not
replicated with other Indian groups. Kieft’s War was the outcome of Dutch attempts in
1639 to force the Indians to pay tribute to the colonists in pelts and com to compensate
for expenses acquired during the building of forts in the colony. The Dutch council

16 William A. Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” in Explorers, Fortunes and
Love Letters: A Window on New Netherland, ed. Martha Dickinson Shattuck (New York: New Netherland
Institute, 2009), 28-29.

12

believed that the Indians were also protected by these forts against neighboring native
groups. Military action arose when the Dutch attacked and massacred the Raritan Indians
in 1640 to avenge the killing of swine on David de Vries’s property.

17

Dutch-Indian

relations deteriorated until Company leadership was altered; at this time, the Company
relinquished its monopoly on the fur trade in 1640.

1ft

Dutch relations with the Mahican

and Munsees were also tense, as the Dutch infringed upon the land of these two groups.
This thesis focuses on Dutch-Mohawk relations almost exclusively because the Dutch
traded beaver furs primarily with this group. Dutch-Mohawk relations were somewhat
unique because of this trading partnership. Nevertheless, to understand the fur trade in
New Netherland, relations with the Mohawk are essential to this study.

17 See J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Narratives o f New Netherland: 1609-1664 (New York: Bames and Noble,
Inc., 1959), 183-234.
18 Jaap Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland: A Dutch Settlement in Seventeenth-Century America
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 76,110.
13

CHAPTER I
THE NORTH AMERICAN PELTRY TRADE IN THE EARLY YEARS:
CONCILIATORY EXPERIENCES
The fur trade in Virginia and New Netherland was a response to a significant
decline in skins and furs from Muscovy, which included much of present-day Russia,
during the seventeenth century. Overhunting of furbearing animals in this region led to a
decline in supply. The demand for peltry allowed New World markets to become ever
more important, as the Russian peltry trade decreased by 75% during the 17th century. As
furs and hides were valuable commodities in Europe needed for the production of felt
hats, coats, gloves, boots, writing parchments, furniture, and women’s corsets, the peltry
supply in North America had an assured market demand in Europe.19 As furs and skins
were shipped to Europe, the interconnectedness of European ports increased, with
Amsterdam initially the center of this trade system and France the main supplier of North
American peltry.

on

According to Linda France Stine, “Peltry was used in a variety of

ways, but particularly to express status statements through personal adornment.” As the
semblance of a middle class developed in Europe, the decoration of skins and furs
allowed this class to emulate its betters.

01

According to Adriaen van der Donck’s A

Description o f New Netherland (1655/1656), “That person among them who owns the
most and the best ranks [of furs or pelts] as [is] the grandest, like someone here [New

19 Linda France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry: Colonial Perceptions of the Southern Fur
Trade, Circa 1640-1740, ed. Stanley South (Columbia, South Carolina: The South Carolina Institute of
Archaeology and Anthropology and The University of South Carolina, 1990), 6, 9.
20 Susan Sleeper-Smith, “Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World,” in Rethinking the Fur Trade:
Cultures of Exchange in cm Atlantic World (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), xxvxxvi.
21 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 6.
14
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Netherland] who is decked out in fine cloth and gold and silver.”

00

The demand for skins

and furs made the peltry trade in North America a lucrative business, and therefore,
extremely competitive. Susan Sleeper-Smith suggests that the Dutch, English, Swedes,
and French all vied for control of this market between 1600 and 1640. France and
England eventually dominated this business via access to the pays d’en haut after
England took control of Dutch New Netherland.

O'X

Beginning in the 1620s, merchants became interested in the fur trade in Virginia.
In the Chesapeake, the peltry trade primarily included the trade in deerskin, although
beaver pelts were traded on a much smaller scale. At this time, the shipping costs to
transport these furs and skins prohibited the colonists from engaging in this trade for
export. As the cost of shipping became more affordable, furs and skins became profitable
commodities. Nonperishable and easily transported overseas, peltry assumed great
profitability in Virginia.24 While Tributary Indians assumed protection by the Virginia
government in exchange for their skins, similar to the protection received by the Mohawk
from the Dutch, Anglo-Indian relations were tenuous at best.
Early experiences in the fur trade in Virginia and New Netherland were somewhat
similar, in that the colonies primarily organized their trading practices with the natives
via trading forts; however, the WIC initially had a monopoly on the fur trade in New
Netherland, whereas the Virginia colonists controlled the trade until Governor Berkeley’s
restrictions. In 1645/1646, the fur trade in Virginia was organized by frontier trading

22 Van der Donck, A Description of New Netherlands 118.
23 Sleeper-Smith, “Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World,” xxvi-xxvii.
24 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 11,6, 14.
15

forts, with the leaders of these forts gaining wealth and influence from their position.
Yet, traders did move from village to village to obtain Indian goods.25 In New
Netherland, the West India Company had a monopoly on the fur trade until 1640.
Colonists were required to sell the furs they acquired from trade with the Iroquois to the
WIC for a fixed price, resulting in minimal profits for fur traders. This monopoly was a
point of contention between the colonists and the Company since the beginning of
settlement in the early seventeenth century. The result was a high rate o f illegal trading
and smuggling o f furs on Dutch ships. According to an ordinance of 1638, examined by
Jaap Jacobs, the “.. .illicit cargo took up so much room in the holds of the WIC ships that
hardly any room was left for the legal goods.”26 By 1640, the WIC had lost its monopoly
on the fur trade and shipping to attract emigration to the colony. Amsterdam merchants
thereafter controlled trade between New Netherland and the Dutch Republic. In addition,
patroons, which encouraged agricultural production and the settlement of families to New
Netherland, were permitted to engage in the fur trade outside of WIC trading posts;
however a small fee per pelt was required for this privilege.27 Similar to the trade system
in Virginia, most exchanges between the Dutch and the Mohawk occurred at trading
forts, primarily Fort Orange for the Dutch. In contrast, the Mohawk also traded their furs
by traveling to Dutch houses, negotiating for the best price, whereas Virginians
occasionally traveled to Indian villages to trade. The practice of Mohawk Indians trading
their furs door-to-door eventually led to tension between this native group and their

25 Ibid., 16, 36-37.
26 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 112.
27 Ibid., 140, 112.
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Dutch partners, resulting in legal measures in the 1650s and 1660s.

28

In general, early fur

trading in these colonies between Europeans and Indian groups was peaceful and mainly
occurred at trading forts.
Thomas Stegge, the uncle of William Byrd I, was involved in the deerskin trade in
Virginia, controlling a trading fort at the Falls of the James near present-day Richmond.
In 1670, when Stegge died, he gave his estate in Virginia and England to William Byrd I.
Byrd consequently inherited his uncle’s lucrative Indian trading business. The will of
Thomas Stegge illustrates the amount of wealth that one could gain from the peltry trade,
particularly as a leader of a trading fort. For example, Stegge provided jewelry and
money to help support his wife and sister and granted monetary awards to his mother, his
sister’s children, and Sir William Berkeley. Stegge also owned an Indian girl, likely a
servant, whom he gave his wife, Sarah. Moreover, he bequeathed Thomas Ludwell full
ownership of the house, furniture, and lands that Stegge and Ludwell seem to have jointly
owned. Virginia in 1670 was still a wilderness for many colonists where the comforts of
England were lacking. Yet, Thomas Stegge’s will suggests that the trade in deerskin
made him a very wealthy man, allowing him to emulate some of the luxuries of country
gentry in England, such as the ownership of a servant, furniture, rings, jewels, and
bracelets. Inheriting Stegge’s plantation and fort, William Byrd secured his financial
status and influence in the Chesapeake.

28 Ibid., 116-177.
29 Ibid., 18.
30 “Will of Thomas Stegge,” in Virginia Colonial Records Project [database online] (Richmond, Virginia:
The Library o f Virginia, 5 April 1960), http://image.lva.virginia.gov/VTLS/CR/03546/index.htmI.
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To understand how the fur trade operated in Virginia, William Byrd’s experience
provides a case study to analyze English-Indian exchange, despite the fact that his
accounts are dated after Bacon’s Rebellion. Byrd had learned how to manage a fur
trading business from his uncle Stegge, and it is likely that his business concerns and
operation remained the same after the uprising. William Byrd’s involvement in the
deerskin trade and tobacco cultivation is described in his letters to Perry & Lane, a
merchant firm handling goods to and from the colonies. Byrd depended on the services
of Perry & Lane to send his hogsheads o f skins and tobacco to England. On April 25,
1684, in a letter addressed to Perry & Lane, Byrd acknowledged the complaints of his
Indian traders regarding the quality of English goods being exchanged for furs and skins.
Byrd wrote, “I have had many complaints about my stockings this year as allso of hats,
threds & some of the linnen, iron worke & nails the worst ever seen, which I hope will
hereafter bee mended.”

o1

This was not the first or last time Byrd voiced his concerns to

Perry & Lane about shipments of second-rate English goods for trade with the natives.
On February 25,1683, Byrd mentioned complaints regarding duffields and cotton.

'XO

These complaints on duffel, a thick woolen cloth, were reiterated on March 29,1685.
According to Byrd, the Indians did not wish to trade for light blue duffel, as “a darker
blew pleases better.”33 On February 2,1684, Byrd asked Perry & Lane to speak to the
gunsmith in England about the weaponry sent to Virginia. According to Byrd, if the dogs

31 William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 25 April 1684, The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of
Westover, Virginia, 1684-1776, ed. Marion Tinling (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University Press of
Virginia, 1977), 14.
32 William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 25 February 1683, The Correspondence o f the Three William Byrds of
Westover, 10.
33 William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 29 March 1685, The Correspondence o f the Three William Byrds of
Westover, 30.
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of the gun lock did not have a good hold, the Indians refused to trade for them.34 Byrd’s
letters to Perry & Lane suggest that English merchants were attempting to flood the
market with low quality goods for trade with the natives. His correspondence to the
merchant firm also illustrates the agency of the Indians and their influence over the goods
that were shipped to the colony. The natives controlled the type and quality o f goods sent
to Virginia by their acceptance or refusal to trade for them. The Mohawk were also
demanding consumers in their exchanges with the Dutch. They desired “hats, linen,
shirts, and stockings” as well as duffel and ironware, including guns.35 On Harmen
Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s journey into Mohawk settlements, he traded beaver pelts
for awls, knives, scissors, needles, and blankets, probably duffel.36 Isaac de Rasiere,
secretary of New Netherland in the 1620s, acknowledged that the Indians desired black
duffel to prevent animals from spotting them in the woods.37 According to Linda France
Stine, English trade goods may have had symbols of status to the Chesapeake natives, as
-1 Q

illustrated by the specific color duffel the Indians desired.

From these examples, it is

obvious that Virginia Indians and the Mohawk were unwilling to trade their skins and
furs for inferior goods, suggesting that the peltry trade was mutually beneficial to the
colonists and Indians alike.

34 William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 2 February 1684, The Correspondence o f the Three William Byrds of
Westover, 29.
35 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 137. Quote on page 137.
36 Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634-1635: The
Journal o f Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, trans. and ed. Charles T. Gehring and William A. Stama
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 16.
37 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 137.
38 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 30.
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The early experiences of Dutch fur traders in New Netherland are described by
Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s account of exchanges with the Mohawk. Dutch
merchants were attracted to North America to gain access to beaver pelts, as there was a
highly profitable market for this natural resource in the hat-making business. From the
beginning of their settlement in and around New Netherland, Dutch fur traders, allied
with the Mohawk, came in contact with French fur traders in New France, who received
beaver pelts from the Huron. The New Netherlanders feared French encroachment on
Dutch access to furs in the interior. The Dutch were suspicious that the French would
attempt to enter into a trade alliance with the Mohawk, negatively impacting the
profitability of New Netherland for the West India Company. By the 1630s, the Dutch
fur trade had declined. In 1634, the Dutch sent Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert to
lead a three-party expedition into Mohawk Country to investigate the decline in furs,
speculating French interference.39 According to William A. Stama, this may have been
the first time the Dutch traveled to Mohawk Country, as Mohawk settlements did not
border Dutch forts.40 Van den Bogaert’s account illustrates that Dutch relations with the
Mohawk were pacified by circumstances outside of their control, namely French furtrading operations in New France. Relations between the Dutch and the Mohawk
remained mutually beneficial as both groups profited from the fur trade, and the Mohawk
received Dutch protection against their enemies, including the French Indians.
As Van den Bogaert and two other Dutchmen traveled to the interior, they came
in contact with Mohawk Indians traveling to Fort Orange to deliver furs to the Dutch.
39 Van den Bogaert, A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, xiii-xiv, xix.
40 Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” 31.
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Entering the home of a chief, the colonists

.counted in his house 120 pelts of

marketable beaver that he had caught with his own hands. We ate beaver’s meat here
everyday.”41 These pelts were almost certainly intended for trade with the Dutch at Fort
Orange. Departing from this chiefs dwelling, the colonists made their way to another
chiefs castle and traded an awl for a beaver 42 The beaver trade relied on the Indians’
access to Dutch trade items from which they could benefit, including guns. To support
this point, when the Dutchmen encountered a Mohawk councilor on their travels, the
Indian asked the colonists if they had brought gifts for exchange. When Van den Bogaert
replied that they had not, the councilor chided them. According to Van den Bogaert, the
councilor
.. .said that we were worth nothing because we brought him no gifts. Then he told
how the French had traded with them here with six men and had given them good
gifts; for they had traded in the aforementioned river [Oswego or Oneida] last
August of this year with six men. We saw there good timber axes, French shirts,
coats, and razors. And this councillor derided us as scoundrels, and said that we
were worthless because we gave them so little for their furs. They said that the
French gave them six hands of sewant [wampum] for one beaver and all sorts of
other things in addition.43
Traditional historians have often focused on Europeans as the exploiters of native
peoples. However, this passage, assuming Van den Bogaert’s account is accurate, shows
that the Mohawk were just as likely to exploit the Europeans. The trade in furs was not
only profitable for Europeans, but it also made the Indians the receivers of highly soughtafter European goods. If the Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk, received a better price
for their furs from the French as opposed to the Dutch, they would sell their pelts to

41 Van den Bogaert, A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 5-6.
42 Ibid., 7.
43 Ibid., 13.
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French traders. According to the Mohawk councilor, the Dutch were worthless because
they did not offer the Indians a fair price for their goods.

This passage also suggests that the Dutch fur trade had diminished because of
French competition, an external factor which never played a role in the Chesapeake peltry
exchange. The French intrusion on the Dutch fur trade in the region clearly concerned
the West India Company because o f its loss in profits. It seems as though the Mohawk
acted on fears of a potential French-Mohawk fur-trading alliance to secure a higher
market value for their furs from the Dutch, a price greater than the French were offering.
The Mohawk, like the Dutch, benefited from their alliance and wanted to remain partners
in the fur trade. Yet, the Mohawk were unwilling to settle for meager items in exchange
for lucrative pelts, just as William Byrd’s Indian traders were unwilling to exchange their
skins for shoddy goods. As a result, the Dutch were forced to renegotiate the price of
furs, an expectation of the WIC when they sent the Dutchmen on this mission. When the
Indians offered five beaver skins to the Dutch, they requested “.. .four hands of sewant
[wampum] and four hands of long cloth [duffel] for each large beaver... .’,44 The
Mohawk eventually settled for “four hands,” a price that secured a Dutch monopoly on
Mohawk furs.45 After the Dutch and Mohawk agreed to a new price structure for furs,
the Mohawk showered the Dutchmen with furs as gifts for the remainder of the
expedition, reminding the colonists that if they received

.more for their pelts, then they

would bring us many pelts.”46 Profits from the fur trade were evidently of mutual

44 Ibid., 15.
45 Ibid., 16.
46 Ibid., 19.
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importance and benefit to the Dutch and the Mohawk, an incentive which sustained their
partnership.

Van den Bogaert also recorded an interaction he had with several Mohawk
Indians, who told him of their fear of the French Indians. According to this account, a
central reason the Mohawk made peace with the Dutch was because they feared the
Huron, refusing to travel to their settlements far in the interior despite the abundance of
beaver there.47 The Dutch-Mohawk alliance benefited the Mohawk because they
received protection from the Dutch against other native peoples via the arms trade.

In addition to Van den Bogaert’s account, Adriaen van der Donck’s A Description
o f New Netherland describes the Dutch-Mohawk fur trade and its profitability for the
Netherlands. Like their English counterparts in the Chesapeake, Dutch fur traders in
New Netherland responded to the decline in peltry from Muscovy by exporting North
American furs and skins to Europe, According to Van der Donck, the cold winter
weather in New Netherland contributed to the high quality furs found there, arguing that
“ .. .pelts and furs actually surpass those of Muscovy in beauty and quality.”

Describing

the hunting of the beaver by the Mohawk, Van der Donck claimed that the beaver were
trapped by the Indians far inland, as the population o f beaver had declined in and around
New Netherland. According to the Dutchman, the Mohawk hunted the beaver in large
groups, living off the land for a month or two at a time. During the hunt, which primarily
occurred from December to June, each Indian trapped between forty and eighty beavers

47 Ibid., 14.
48 Van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, 70.
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as well as other fur-bearing animals.49 In his account, Van der Donck suggested that
. .an average of eighty thousand beavers per year are killed in this part of the country,
not counting elk, bears, otters, and deer.”50 However, Jaap Jacobs argues that this figure
is too high, as Van der Donck’s account was designed to encourage migration to the
colony. According to records from the 1650s, the time in which Van der Donck wrote
and published his account, approximately forty thousand beavers were killed per year,
half the number Van der Donck attributed to the trade. This was a marked increase from
the 1630s, in which approximately eight thousand to ten thousand beavers were killed
annually.51 Clearly, the fur trade in New Netherland was a profitable business, which
also made it highly competitive after the WIC monopoly was relinquished. While
statistics on the Chesapeake deerskin trade are not available for the second half of the
seventeenth century, statistics from 1700-1701 suggest that approximately fifteen
thousand skins were being exported to Europe.52 While this figure was calculated after
Bacon’s Rebellion, the trade in deerskin in Virginia was a smaller enterprise than the
beaver trade in New Netherland.
Early fur trading experiences in Virginia and New Netherland were relatively
peaceful. In both settlements, the Native Americans with whom the colonists traded with
were demanding customers. For Europeans and the Indians alike, the peltry trade was
favorable: the Europeans acquired lucrative skins and furs for export overseas and the

49 Ibid., 99,121.
50 Ibid., 99.
51 Jaap Jacobs, New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century America (Boston: Brill, 2005),
198-201.
52 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 11. Adapted from Crane 1928, Table 1, Appendix A, p.
328.
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Indians received desirable European goods. When the Indians received items from the
Europeans which were unfavorable or did not provide an even exchange, the Indians
voiced their concerns. In this mercantile system, the Indians had control over the
European goods which were offered them as well as their quality. To obtain profitable
skins and furs, the Europeans had to appease the natives by granting them sought-after,
well-made imports. Both groups sought to exploit each other to reap the benefits of this
profitable trade. Unlike Virginia’s trade in deerskin, the fur trade in the colony of New
Netherland had to contend with outside European forces, such as the French, who could
damage Dutch relations and trading potential with the Mohawk. While European
competition was a fear of the WIC and the Dutch colonists involved in the beaver trade, it
also helped to pacify relations with the Mohawk. The Mohawk benefited from Dutch
protection against the French Indians, or Huron. French competition likely served to
create a pacific, working relationship between the Dutch and the Mohawk. In general,
early experiences in the peltry trade for the English and the Dutch in Virginia and New
Netherland, respectively, benefited the European colonists and the natives equally,
creating nonviolent relations marked by mutual dependence.
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CHAPTER II
VIOLENCE, TENSION, AND THE PELTRY TRADE
As the peltry trade developed in Virginia and New Netherland, tensions arose
between the colonists and their Indian trading partners. In Virginia, these tensions turned
to violence during Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676. While the Dutch in New Netherland never
experienced combat with the Mohawk, competition over this lucrative trade in both
colonies produced hostilities between the colonists themselves and between the colonists
and the Indians. The later fur trading experiences in these settlements differed
significantly. To understand this phenomenon, I will first analyze the underlying cause
and circumstances surrounding Bacon’s Rebellion, as this uprising marked the peak of
colonial violence with native populations in Virginia and therefore provides a way in
which to measure tension against. I will then contrast this unrest in Virginia with events
in New Netherland between the Dutch and the Mohawk over brokerage in the 1650s and
1660s, which created unease in the colony but did not produce violence. After examining
conflict in both colonies, I will assess the divergent experiences in Virginia and New
Netherland in the conclusion.
To understand how Anglo-Indian fur trading relations broke down in the
Chesapeake, Bacon’s Rebellion illustrates the apex of the tensions between the colonists
and the Virginia natives. Historians have portrayed Bacon’s Rebellion as a turning point
in Virginia’s colonial history. For Edmund S. Morgan, Bacon’s Rebellion marked the
moment when white colonists realized their commonalities as a group and transferred
their racism from Native Americans to Africans, an argument now taken as fact by
26

historians such as T.H. Breen.53 Bacon’s Rebellion was the first popular uprising in
America according to Charles M. Andrews and signified competition among rival elite
groups for position in an increasingly closed society. Interestingly, Nathaniel Bacon did
have a prominent supporter: William Byrd, the father of the well-known Colonel
William Byrd of Westover. Bacon and Byrd were allies and neighbors, both heavily
involved in the trade for furs, albeit illegally as they did not have proper licensure from
Governor Berkeley. When Bacon and Byrd applied for a license as partners in the peltry
trade in 1675, government officials denied their request. In March 1676, the Assembly
excluded regular traders from obtaining licensure.54 Byrd encouraged Bacon to lead the
rebels at Jordan’s Point, beginning the uprising.55 According to Warren M. Billings,
historians have failed to produce an explanation for this event given its significance to the
history of Virginia. Historians have argued that Nathaniel Bacon was a hero, juxtaposing
Sir William Berkeley as a royalist villain. Interestingly, Wilcomb E. Washburn reversed
these roles, and he instead emphasized Berkeley’s failed Indian policy as a key factor that
lead to rebellion. Billings synthesized various arguments, suggesting that the uprising
was a response to a tenuous society, burdened by taxes, low tobacco prices, increasing
debt, and Berkeley’s lack of control in colony affairs.56 Whether Nathaniel Bacon or
Governor Berkeley was a hero or villain is not the focus of this thesis. Bacon’s Rebellion
53 See Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal o f Colonial Virginia (New
York: Norton & Company, 1975) and T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes, “Myne Owne G r o u n d R a c e and
Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1640-1676 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
54 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 20. Marion Tinling, ed., The Correspondence o f the
Three William Byrds o f Westover, 1.
55 Charles M. Andrews, ed., Narratives o f the Insurrections, 1675-1690 (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage
Books, Inc., 1992), 110-111.
56 See Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom. Warren M. Billings, “The Causes of Bacon’s
Rebellion: Some Suggestions,” The Virginia Magazine o f History and Biography 78, no. 4 (October,
1970): 409-410, 423-424.
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demonstrates Anglo-Powhatan relations in the trade for deerskin as a point of conflict,
both among the colonists and among the natives. By analyzing documents drafted by
Bacon and his followers, personal narratives of the rebellion, Robert Beverley’s The
History and Present State o f Virginia (1705), and the Royal Commissioners’ 1677 report,
it is apparent that Berkeley’s Indian policy in regards to the peltry trade was a central
cause o f the uprising. When Governor Berkeley restricted the trade in skins, the mutual
benefits of exchange between the colonists and the natives ceased to exist and conflict
was the natural outcome.
In The Declaration o f the People, a document Nathaniel Bacon issued in 1676
summarizing grievances against Governor Berkeley and his “Councellours and
Confederates, Aiders, and Assistants,” Bacon pointed blame at the Governor for
“advancing to Places of Judicature, scandalous and ignorant Favourites.”

cn

This

statement is likely a reference to Governor Berkeley’s policy of issuing fur trading
licenses to his elite friends, denying Bacon and other colonists the privilege of legally
engaging in this lucrative trade for skins. This conclusion seems credible considering
that Bacon’s subsequent grievance is related to the fur trade, suggesting that Berkeley and
his accomplices have wronged the colonists “...by assuming the monopolie of the Beaver
Trade.”58 In colonial Virginia, the beaver trade included the trade in deerskin, as
deerskin was more readily available than beaver pelts and the quality of the skins in
demand. This grievance explicitly states that the Virginia elite denied access to the trade

57 “The Declaration of the People, against Sr: Wm: Berkeley, and Present Governors of Virginia,” in
Personal Narratives from the Virtual Jamestown Project, 1575-1705, Crandall Shifflett, 2000,
http ://etext.lib. Virginia. edu/etcbin/jamestown-browse?id=J1035.
58 Ibid.
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in skins to colonists outside of their closed circle of Mends. Moreover, this document
argues that Berkeley protected certain groups of Indians at the expense of the colonists’
safety.59 After the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Virginia’s defenses were questioned by the
colonists as Indians began encroaching on white settlements in the northern and western
frontier lands, raiding these areas. According to colonial accounts, Berkeley was
ineffective in preventing Indian attacks.60 The fact that these complaints are featured
early in the Declaration, grievances three through six, and are mentioned explicitly in a
total of five grievances, conveys that Berkeley’s Indian policy and restricted access to the
fur trade were central causes of Bacon’s Rebellion.61
While the colonists petitioned the Governor to send volunteers to fight the Indians
and to protect them from raids, public records from April 1676 suggest that the colonists
initially did not wish to fight all Indians.62 Rather, it seems that the colonists had
designated certain native peoples as Mends and the Susquahanocks and Occaneechee as
enemies. Thomas Stegge’s trading fort, which William Byrd inherited, was located on
the Occaneechee Trial, thereby providing access to trade with the Catawbas and the
Cherokee.

f kX

Early in 1676, the colonists considered the Occaneechee to be their allies

59 Ibid.
60 Warren M. Billings, ed., The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History o f
Virginia, 1606-1689 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 243.
61 “The Declaration of the People,” Virtual Jamestown, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/jamestownbrowse?id=J1035.
62 “Frontier Planters Petition Governor Berkeley to Commission Volunteers Against the Indians, CA.
Spring 1676,” in The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia,
1606-1689, ed. Warren M. Billings (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press,
1975), 267.
63 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 19.
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against the Doegs and the Susquahanocks.64 When the Occaneechee refused to give the
spoils, namely furs and skins, from their raids on the Susquahanocks to Nathaniel Bacon
during the rebellion, the Occaneechee became the enemies of the colonists. After
Bacon’s Rebellion, the Occaneechee traded with the colonists, including William Byrd,
on a much smaller scale, and it seems as if this native group never reassumed its
prominence in the Virginia peltry trade.65
In response to Berkeley’s incompetence in dealing with Indian attacks, the
colonists attempted to take matters into their own hands to protect themselves from harm.
Yet, when seeking aid from friendly natives, the colonists recorded that

.the Indians in

all places [were] unwilling to assist us against the Common Enemy [the Susquahanocks
and Occaneechee], they having received orders to the contrary from the Right
Honourable the Govemer....”

As a result, the colonists were forced to seek Indian aid

further from Jamestown, obtaining only 24 men from the Nottowaies and Mayherings.67
In essence, Berkeley’s Indian policy divided native groups, who competed against each
other for natural resources, deerskin and furs, as well as Berkeley’s favor in trading with
the colonial elite. In providing aid to Bacon and his supporters, these Indian peoples
would forfeit their ability to trade deerskin with Berkeley’s associates. Bacon’s response,
to travel deeper into the south to gain Indian allies, brought more Indian nations into the
conflict. Bacon’s anger over Berkeley’s monopoly on this profitable trade eventually led

64 “Nathaniel Bacon’s Victory Over the Indians, April 1676,” in The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth
Century: A Documentary History o f Virginia, 1606-1689, ed. Warren M. Billings (Chapel Hill, North
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 267.
65 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 21-22.
66 “Nathaniel Bacon’s Victory Over the Indians, April 1676,” 267.
67 Ibid.
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him and his supporters to bring civil war and destruction to all enemy (and oftentimes
friendly) Indian nations. Bacon’s motives for leading the rebellion were twofold: access
to the deerskin trade and profit from this market.
A letter written by a Virginian, Mrs. An. Cotton, to a Mr. C.H. at Yardly in
Northamptonshire, explains the events surrounding Bacon’s Rebellion and reinforces the
importance of the deerskin trade as a catalyst for revolt. While Mrs. Cotton’s letter was
written in 1686, a decade after the uprising, her recollection of the events supports other
documentation and provides an eyewitness account of Bacon’s Rebellion from a female
Virginian who was not directly involved in the fighting. According to Mrs. Cotton,
Nathaniel Bacon questioned the Governor and those in power as to how they had
obtained their wealth. Mrs. Cotton implied in her letter that Bacon believed the
authorities were stealing from the public treasury for their own advancement and had
profited from a monopoly on the deerskin trade. Moreover, Mrs. Cotton suggests that
Bacon believed that the authorities, who were the trading partners of the natives, were
selling “.. .the blood of there bretheren and country men” by providing the Indians with
weapons, contrary to colonial law.68 Mrs. Cotton’s account is in accordance with other
sources and suggests that Bacon wanted access to the fur trade for monetary gain,
envious of the wealth Berkeley and his grandees acquired through the trade in deerskin.
Bacon’s Manifesto supports the grievances defined by The Declaration o f the
People, colonial public records, and Mrs. Cotton’s letter. For example, Bacon argued in
68 Mrs. An. Cotton, of Q. Creeke, “An Account of our Late Troubles in Viriginia, Written in 1686,” in
Personal Narratives from the Virtual Jamestown Project, 1575-1705, Crandall Shifflett, 2000,
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/jamestown-browse?id=J 1058.
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his manifesto that Governor Berkeley defended and protected Indian groups who invaded
the colonists, rejecting the complaints of these “Most loyall Subjects” against the
natives.69 Berkeley continued to arm the Indians despite colonial Virginia laws which
prohibited this practice. While Berkeley likely provided the natives with ammunition to
hunt deer for their skins, in his manifesto, Bacon argued that these guns were being used
against the colonists and were “destructfull to us.” This document suggests that
Governor Berkeley blamed Bacon and his followers for ruining trade and commerce with
the natives, despite the fact that the Indians, according to Bacon, were murdering
innocent Virginians. Bacon’s manifesto concludes that the peltry trade was the root
cause of the Indian attacks and the subsequent rebellion. Bacon writes, “If it should be
said that the very foundation of all these disasters the Grant of the Beaver trade to the
Right Honourable Govemour was illegall and not granteable by any power here present
as being a monopoly, were not this to deserve the name of Rebell and Traytor.”

7n

This

manifesto makes clear that Bacon and his followers believed that the Governor was a
traitor to the colonists because he was providing fur trading licenses to his allies, of
which Bacon and most other colonists were excluded. These colonists believed that
Berkeley’s monopoly on the deerskin and beaver pelt trade was unlawful and contributed
to Berkeley’s indifference to Indian attacks against loyal subjects and their plantations.
Warren M. Billings has argued that scholars have placed too much emphasis on
manifestos drafted by Bacon or his supporters. While the manifestos present charges

69 “Bacon’s ‘Manifesto,’” in The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History o f
Virginia, 1606-1689, ed. Warren M. Billings (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1975), 278.
70 Ibid., 279.
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against Governor Berkeley at the time of rebellion, Billings suggests that these
documents are nothing more than “skillful propaganda documents which played upon
latent discontent with devastating effect.”71 Despite the fact that these documents may be
exaggerations of the truth, the claims Bacon asserted against the Governor in his
manifesto are supported by other primary sources from the period. In addition, while the
manifesto may have been aimed to persuade, there is truth behind influential, exaggerated
narratives. The numerous references to the southern fur trade in this manifesto and other
documents during the rebellion cannot be ignored. While Berkeley’s monopoly may not
have angered all of Bacon’s supporters, it is clearly the foundation of Nathaniel Bacon’s
rebellious actions. Truth lies behind Bacon’s embellishments.
Robert Beverley, one of the Governor’s “pernicious” assistants listed by Bacon in
The Declaration o f the People, provided an account of the rebellion in his book, The
History and Present State o f Virginia (1705). While this account, like Mrs. Cotton’s
letter, was written after the uprising, Beverley, apparently one of Bacon’s adversaries,
acknowledged the role of the fur trade in producing the rebellion. Beverley argued that
Bacon wanted the Governor to grant him a commission to fight the Indians to “.. .secure a
Monopoly of the Indian Trade to himself and his Friends.”

77

In addition, when Governor

Berkeley fled to Accomack, fearing the march of the Baconites to Jamestown, he was not
welcomed by the colonists. Instead, the people of Accomack

. .began to make Terms

with him [Berkeley] for Redress of their Grievances, and for the Ease and Liberty of

71 Billings, “The Causes o f Bacon’s Rebellion,” 415.
72 Robert Beverley, The History and Present State of Virginia, ed. Louis B. Wright (Chapel Hill, North
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1947), 81, para. 102.
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Trade.”73 The right to freely trade with the natives was a central grievance of Nathaniel
Bacon as well as many colonial subjects. Even Bacon’s foe, Robert Beverley,
acknowledged the restricted access to the fur trade as a key motivation for Bacon’s
actions. After Sir William Berkeley was recalled to England, the new Governor, Herbert
Jeffreys, straightaway attempted to establish peace and allowed free trade between the
colonists and the natives. While Governor Jeffreys restrained trade with the Indians to
certain Marts, he did attempt to rectify the colonists’ complaints against Berkeley’s
restrictive fur trading licenses. According to Beverley, the Indians refused to bring their
commodities to certain marts, which made the new restrictions useless.74 Yet, the fact
that Jeffreys, upon taking office, permitted the colonists to trade freely with the Indians
showcases the significance of trade, particularly the fur trade, to Bacon’s Rebellion.
In September 1676, news of Bacon’s Rebellion travelled to England. In 1677, the
same year in which Governor Berkeley was recalled by the Crown, the King sent a
special commission and English troops to Virginia to settle the colony’s affairs. The
subsequent report by the commissioners illustrates their conviction that the Governor and
his elite friends were responsible for the uprising; again, the fur trade takes a leading role
in the narrative documented by the King’s commissioners.
Investigating local complaints, the commissioners concluded that the colonists
were resentful of Sir William Berkeley and his trusted circle of friends, who had a
monopoly on the fur trade. The colonists were also angered by the Governor’s defense of

73 Ibid., 81, para. 105.
74 Ibid., 86-87, para. 115.
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the Indians and his unwillingness to protect them from attack. The narrative of the
commissioners explicitly states these points:
This made the People jealous that the Governor for the lucre o f the Beaver and
otter trade etc. with the Indians, rather sought to protect the Indians than them,
Since after publick Proclamation prohibiting all trade with the Indians (they
complaine) hee privately gave commission to some of his Friends to truck with
them, and that those persons furnished the Indians with Powder, Shott etc. soe that
they were better provided than his Majestye’s Subjects.75
The commissioners also recounted that Governor Berkeley forbade the colonists to attack
the Indians without first receiving orders to do so. This angered the colonists, who
believed their lives and property were in danger. The commissioners suggested that the
colonists had no way of knowing a friendly Indian from an enemy as it was illegal for
them to engage in open or free trade with the Indians. Yet, it is important to
acknowledge that some Indians did support the colonists, as Bacon had Indian scouts in
his army. According to the commissioners’ report, Bacon’s army was served by some ten
Indians who spied and killed other Indian parties. To some extent, Bacon’s Rebellion
was also an Algonquian civil war in that groups of Indians fought each other to obtain the
skins and furs desired by the Englishmen. Access to this highly profitable trade in skins
was of the utmost importance to both the colonists and Indians alike, with all classes of
colonists and various Indian nations competing for entry into this market. With the
tobacco market depressed by overproduction and the selling of poor quality tobacco, the
deerskin trade was an avenue to wealth and success in colonial Virginia. It is no surprise
that skins and furs were prized by Bacon and his followers as bootie from raids on Indian

75 Andrews, ed., Narratives o f the Insurrections, 109.
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settlements.

Low tobacco prices and debt led many colonists to believe that the export

of deerskin was the path to upward mobility, which seems to have been the Baconites’
goal: to get rich from the deerskin market.
Bacon’s Rebellion was a response to the restrictive trade practices Governor
Berkeley and his associates had exercised, preventing the colonists and natives from
openly and freely trading deerskin and beaver pelts. Berkeley and his grandees desired a
monopoly on the fur trade because skins and furs were highly profitable export
commodities. With a declining economy due to low tobacco prices, access to the
deerskin trade was crucial to the colonists’ monetary success. By examining a wide
range of documents which describe the uprising, the fur trade is clearly at the heart of the
conflict. The trade for furs in Virginia divided the Englishmen and their native neighbors
as all groups involved were driven by personal gain. For the colonists, the mutual
benefits of the peltry exchange ceased to exist when Governor Berkeley restricted their
access to this trade. For the natives, the encroachment by the colonists on Indian lands to
grow tobacco had long put a wedge in their relations with the English. During Bacon’s
Rebellion, the Indians were forced to compete for favor among divisive Virginians,
which created conflict between the Indians and the English as well as among different
Indian groups. Bacon’s Rebellion illustrates the peltry trade at its worst, a period when
the trade was not mutually beneficial to the English or the Indians.
After the uprising and the subsequent reform measures instituted by Governor
Jeffreys, some semblance of the peltry trade did survive in Virginia, and William Byrd
76 Ibid., 112-113, 124-125,127.
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remained a key player in this market. While Byrd was profiting from his exchange with
the natives, as illustrated by the goods he purchased for his private use from Perry &
Lane,
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it is also clear that there was tension between the Virginians and the Indians after

Bacon’s Rebellion. In 1679, Byrd became colonel of the militia to command the Falls of
the James, as Byrd had a reputation for being an expert on the natives.78 In a letter
addressed to Thomas Grendon, a member of Byrd’s extended family, on April 29, 1684,
Byrd mentioned that he spoke to Seneca Indians and that they

. .promised to behave

themselves hereafter very peaceable towards the English.”79 While Byrd did not
elaborate on the circumstances surrounding his conversation with the Seneca, as the
reader probably had some knowledge of the situation, a conflict of unknown cause did
arise between the two groups. This was not an exceptional case and illustrates the more
violent relations between the English and the Indians throughout Virginia’s colonial
history, as compared to New Netherland.
By the late seventeenth century, South Carolinians became competitors against
Virginia’s access to the peltry supply, trading with the Catawba and Cherokee as well as
the Lower Creeks.80 With the fur trading market increasingly accessible to more
colonists after the Proprietors relinquished their monopoly in the 1690s, South
Carolinians protected their relations with the natives and rejected Indian slavery as the

77 See William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 30 July 1688, The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of
Westover, 85-86. Byrd tells Perry & Lane to send him one dozen shoes for his wife, slippers, children’s
shoes, table linen, etc.
78 Marion Tinling, ed., The Correspondence o f the Three William Byrds of Westover, 4.
79 William Byrd to Thomas Grendon, 29 April 1684, The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of
Westover, 16.
80 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 24.
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central labor force of the colony.81 According to Linda France Stine, “By the mid-1690s,
deerskins were worth more than [African] slaves. At this time, there were fewer
restrictions on trade, and deerskins were the most valuable commodity shipped to
England....”

Virginians abandoned the fur trade due to competition from South

Carolina, concentrating their efforts on other export markets, including agriculture, by the
close of the seventeenth century. Bacon’s Rebellion and especially the interference by
South Carolina’s fur traders depressed the lucrative peltry business in the Chesapeake.
In contrast to the fur trade in Virginia, the trade in beaver furs in New Netherland,
the colony’s leading export commodity and accessible to Dutch colonists after 1640,
required a strong and cohesive partnership between the colonists and the Mohawk, their
principal exchange allies. When the settlement was merely a fur-trade outpost in 1609,
the beaver had been overhunted in the coastal regions and around the Hudson Valley.
The Dutch relied on the Mohawk to obtain furs, as these natives traveled into the interior
to hunt the beaver. This in turn made the coastal Indians, who lived in areas where furbearing animals were near extinction, less valuable. Historian William A. Stama argues
that Dutch relations with the surrounding native populations were more complex than
Allen Trelease argued in Indian Affairs in Colonial New York (1960). Stama suggests
that merely dividing the Indian groups into “expendable” and “valuable” based on their
access and control over the peltry supply, which was the premise of Trelease’s work,
simplifies Dutch-Indian relations.83 Stama suggests that both the Dutch and the Mohawk

81 Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina From 1670 Through the Stono
Rebellion (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1974), 39.
82 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 25.
83 Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” 27-28.
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interpreted their relationship as mutually beneficial; the Mohawk had more to gain from
the Dutch than material goods, a claim supported by the primary evidence. DutchMohawk relations were pacific for two reasons. First, the Mohawk received guns and
protection from the Dutch against their competitors in the interior in exchange for beaver
pelts, a profitable export commodity for the Dutch. Second, the Dutch did not engage in
land sales with the Mohawk until late in the colony’s existence. Dutch protection
coupled with the lack of encroachment on Mohawk lands contributed to a trade
partnership which was accommodating to the Mohawk while simultaneously beneficial to
the Dutch who obtained sought-after furs.
Due to the depletion of furs near New Netherland, an area encompassing Munsee
and Mahican territory in the lower Hudson Valley, these Algonquian peoples sold their
land for Dutch trade goods. While private persons were required to have their land sales
with the Indians approved by Dutch officials under the Freedoms and Exemptions of
1629, it seems as though some colonists were acting independent of the director and
council to gain land from the natives. Potentially a response to Dutch-Algonquian
conflict over land, the 1652 ordinance reiterated the importance of land for the colony,
not individuals. The Dutch purchased large tracks of land from the Munsee and the
Mahican, as these lands abutted Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. By contrast, the
Mohawk lived further in the interior and did not have constant contact with the Dutch.
Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s 1634 account is the first record of Dutchmen
journeying to Mohawk territory after more than two decades of trade with this Iroquoian
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group. The Dutch did not engage in land sales with the Mohawk until 1661.

84

•

According

to William A. Stama, “.. .the late acquisition of Mohawk land by the Dutch most
certainly acted to forestall and perhaps avoid altogether the violent clashes that marked
Dutch-Algonquian relations in the Hudson Valley.”85 The Dutch clearly had a unique
trading relationship with the Mohawk, their partners in the fur trade. By not infringing
upon Mohawk land, and therefore Mohawk settlement practices and ways of life, this, in
part, pacified Dutch relations with these native peoples.

When the WIC abandoned its monopoly on the fur trade in New Netherland, its
practice o f fixing the price for beaver furs was also eliminated. Individual colonists
subsequently decided the price they paid for this profitable resource; however, trading
alcohol or guns to the natives in exchange for their furs was illegal. In a Fort Orange
court session held on July 16,1658, Poulus Janssen was charged with selling brandy to
the Indians. According to the court, this was “...a matter of very dangerous consequence,
which cannot be tolerated in a country where justice prevails.”

8f \

Janssen was banished

from the province for six years and ordered to pay 500 guilders as punishment for his
unlawful action.

87

Jaap Jacobs has argued that despite the severe sentences proscribed by

the laws governing New Netherland, punishments were more lenient in practice and
banishment was rarely carried out.

88

The Mohawk also appeared before the court at Fort

Orange to complain of the sale of alcohol. On September 6, 1659, the Mohawk requested

84 Ibid., 30-32.
85 Ibid., 32.
86 Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., Fort Orange Court Minutes, 1652-1660 (New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1990), 388.
87 Ibid., 388.
88 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 115.
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that alcohol not be sold to the Indians in exchange for furs. According to the Indians,
“We have to anticipate our enemies, the French; and if we drink ourselves drunk, we
OQ

cannot fight.”

^

While some natives desired alcohol as a way to become closer with the

spiritual world, it seems as though New Netherland officials and Mohawk leaders were
against this practice.90 Selling alcohol to Indians was a threat to New Netherland’s
security, according to the magistrates; Mohawk leaders, who needed their warriors
prepared for enemy attacks, also frowned upon the practice.
The sale in guns and powder to the Indians was also severely punished by law to
protect the colony. The death penalty was required by ordinances passed in 1639 and
reiterated in 1645 for any colonist who sold weapons to the Indians. However, as guns
became attractive commodity goods to the Iroquois, the Dutch could not refuse to offer
weapons in exchange for furs. In response, the arms trade in the colony was theoretically
monopolized by the government. Dutch officials believed that if the traders did not sell
weapons and powder to the Mohawk, these Indians would trade with the English instead,
depressing the Dutch peltry trade. Despite the legal prohibition of this practice,
individual colonists did exchange guns for furs according to court records and
archaeology, as weapons have been found in Indian burial sites 91 Interestingly, the
Mohawk came to Fort Orange in 1659 to demand that their guns be repaired by Dutch
blacksmiths for free if the Indians did not have sewant and that powder be provided to

89 Gehring, Fort Orange Court Minutes, 453.
90 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 115.
91 Ibid., 115-116.
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them. The Mohawk felt that these terms were mutually beneficial, as the Indians would
obtain weaponry for the price of warring against enemy Indians.
There was a fine line between selling guns for trade purposes and affecting a
security threat, as best illustrated in Virginia. While William Byrd supported the Indian
arms trade, Nathaniel Bacon vehemently opposed this practice. As the gun trade was
prohibited by the laws of the colony, Bacon blamed Anglo-Indian violence on the
Governor’s willingness to arm the Indians instead of protecting loyal English subjects. In
both Virginia and New Netherland, guns were important commodities in the peltry
exchange as the Indians used guns to hunt furbearing animals. In New Netherland, the
arms trade allowed the Mohawk to protect themselves against enemy Indians, including
the Mahican and the French Indians. It seems probable that the Mohawk did not have
guns prior to Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s expedition in 1634-1635 due to their
curiosity of pistols and their request for Van den Bogaert and his Dutch counterparts to
fire their weapons on four separate occasions.92 The trade in weapons and gunpowder
generally created a unified and pacific relationship between the Dutch and the Mohawk,
as the Mohawk saw the Dutch as their allies and protectors against outside threats. In
Virginia, however, guns were turned against the colonists as shown by events
surrounding Bacon’s Rebellion. The Chesapeake seems to have been a breeding ground
for violence since the early years of English settlement, illustrated by the first Indian war
of 1609-161493 and the 1622 and 1644 uprisings. Unlike Dutch-Mohawk relations,

92 Van den Bogaert, A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 39, note 69.
93 See J. Frederick Fausz, “An ‘Abundance of Bloodshed on Both Sides’: England’s First Indian War,
1609-1614,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 98, no. 1 (January, 1990).
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English dealings with the Chesapeake natives were rarely mutually beneficial, especially
after tobacco became the primary agricultural export in Virginia and the colonists
continued to encroach upon native land to cultivate it. Linda France Stine argued that
Bacon’s Rebellion was not only a response to the deerskin trade but also the colonists’
increasing need for agricultural land. According to Stine, when the colonists realized that
they could not obtain proper licensure to engage in the skins market, they began killing
Indians for their fertile lands.94 However, English colonists had been infringing upon
native land since the early settlement period; this was not a new problem for the
Chesapeake natives in the late seventeenth century. The North American fur trade
illustrates the different dynamics and circumstances English and Dutch colonists faced
when they entered into the peltry trade with the Indians. While both the English and the
Dutch were forced to exchange weapons for furs to meet the requests of their Indian
consumers, this trade clearly had different results in these colonies. The furs-for-guns
exchange largely created a cohesive bond between the Dutch and the Mohawk, whereas
the gun trade posed a danger to colonists in Virginia.
Dutch fur trading relations with the Mohawk never paralleled the violence that
transpired in late seventeenth century Virginia. By the 1650s and 1660s, tension between
the Dutch and the Mohawk did arise due to the competition for furs among Dutch
colonists, which at times resulted in robbery and assaults against the natives. While the
Mohawk took their complaints to court at Fort Orange, they did not retaliate by force and
a Dutch-Mohawk war never occurred. Peace between the colonists and the Mohawk in

94 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 36.
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the period before English control of the colony may have been a response to the Indians’
need for Dutch protection during the Beaver Wars.
In the 1650s, due to the lucrative nature of the beaver fur trade and the elimination
of the WIC monopoly, individual colonists began competing for favor among the
Iroquois in the hopes of concentrating the peltry trade in the hands of a few Dutchmen.
This fierce competition for furs eventually contributed to a decline in price during the late
1650s, as pelts over-flooded the market. Competition also led to violence against the
natives. As the Indians exchanged their wares from house to house, they were sometimes
beaten or blocked from traveling to other homes to trade.95 The Indians voiced their
complaints regarding this behavior to the court at Fort Orange. On February 8, 1658,
Jochim de Backer was punished for beating an Indian, forced to pay “two pounds
Flemish” for his actions.96 The fur trade was vital to New Netherland society, and Dutch
officials listened to complaints made by Indian fur traders as evidenced by this case.
Dutch officials were likely concerned that if Mohawk fur traders continued to be
assaulted by the Dutch, these Indians would trade their furs with other Europeans, the
French or the English, or seek revenge against the colonists.
Competition for furs led colonists or brokers to wait for Indian traders in the
woods, bypassing the practice of door-to-door trade, to persuade the Indians to sell their
furs to a single Dutch trader.

Q7

The practice of using brokers was outlawed by the

colony; however, on June 6,1657, the court at Fort Orange permitted a one-year hiatus of

95 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 111,116.
96 Gehring, Fort Orange Court Minutes, 352.
97 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 117.
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this law, allowing Indian brokers to be employed for trade at Fort Orange and the
surrounding village o f Beverwijck.98 According to Jaap Jacobs, employing Indian
brokers was expensive and accessible only to the large fur traders, many of whom sat on
the court. This ordinance, therefore, benefited some Dutch officials who established the
hiatus for their own financial benefit." By 1660, debates over the use of Indian and
Dutch brokers were ongoing. While the director general, Petrus Stuyvesant, eventually
decided to prohibit the use of brokers, both Indian and Dutch, the court minutes from Fort
Orange suggest that the use of brokers continued despite the illegality of the practice. On
May 27,1660, court records show that some of the colonists brought to court for using
brokers argued that they would continue to employ this practice “whether it was
permitted or not.”100 The use of brokers was financially beneficial to colonists who could
persuade the natives to trade their furs with them in the woods before the Indians began
their door-to-door soliciting or who stole the furs outright. However, this practice was
not advantageous to the Indians, who were sometimes robbed, maltreated, or beaten in
the woods, or to the director general of the colony, who feared the decline of DutchMohawk relations and trade. On June 26, 1660, the Mohawk appeared before the court at
Fort Orange to request that brokers be disallowed as a result of Dutch violence and
robbery against the Indian traders. According to the Mohawk, if Indians continued to be
ill-treated in the woods, “.. .they will go away and not be seen anymore.”101 The
Mohawk also implied that they would wage war against the Dutch. As a response, the

98 Gehring, Fort Orange Court Minutes, 299.
99 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 117.
100 Gehring, Fort Orange Court Minutes, 502.
101 Ibid., 503.
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magistrates theoretically forbid the colonists from using brokers under penalty of three
hundred guilders and a one-year suspension of the fur trade.102 This conflict at Fort
Orange and Beverwijck shows the importance the fur trade had on the daily lives and
livelihood of the people living in this community, as the organization of the fur trade was
constantly debated by ordinary colonists, magistrates, the director general, and the
Indians who made this trade possible.
The Beaver Wars

, a series of conflicts between the Iroquois and the French-

supported Algonquians during the middle of the seventeenth century, may explain why
the Mohawk did not retaliate by force against the Dutch during the conflict over
brokerage. The Beaver Wars contributed to weakening the Mohawk, possibly preventing
them from fighting against yet another enemy group, the Dutch. In addition, the Mohawk
may have been pacified as the Dutch were their supplier of arms; the Mohawk depended
on weapons for their survival and for the continuation of these wars.104 According to
Dean R. Snow, the Iroquois fought the Algonquians during the Beaver Wars for a variety
of reasons, only one o f which being access and control of the fur trade. These wars were
encouraged by the Dutch, English, and French, all of whom vied for control of the North
American peltry market. The losses of natives to European diseases during the mid
seventeenth century also contributed to this conflict as Indian groups attempted to avenge
the deaths of their members by enslaving natives outside of their community and
adopting them. The French Indians, or Hurons, were brutally beaten by the Mohawk,

102 Ibid., 504.
103 The Beaver Wars lasted for nearly six decades, ending with the signing of the Great Peace in Montreal
in 1701. See Sleeper-Smith, “Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World,” xxviii.
104 Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” 33.
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with many Huron being incorporated and adopted into the Iroquois community.105
Attacks on Algonquian nations triggered the French to move westward to engage in the
fur trade.106 At the same time as the Beaver Wars were being fought, the Mohawk were
also engaged in a series of wars with the Mahican. While the mid-seventeenth century
was clearly a time of change for the Mohawk, marked by constant warfare transformed
by firepower, relations between the Dutch and the Mohawk never escalated to war. As
the Beaver Wars and Mohawk-Mahican Wars were fought, the Iroquois ultimately
reinforced and strengthened their alliance with the Dutch, who provided them with
protection through the sale of guns and offered other desirable trade goods such as duffel
and ironware.

1 (Y1

According to Frenchman Jerome Lalemant, who was involved in the

Jesuit missions among the Huron, the Mohawk were victorious over the Huron because
of the guns provided them by the Dutch. Lalemant argued that the Dutch were able to
secure the beaver fur trade with the Mohawk by supplying them with firearms.

1OR

The

Dutch likely viewed the Mohawk as protectors as well, guardians of the fur trade and
defenders against enemy groups, such as the Mahican and Munsees. Despite
disagreements and tense relations over brokers, the Dutch-Mohawk relationship was
mutually advantageous. “Dutch dependence on the Mohawks grew in much the same
measure as Mohawk dependence on the Dutch.”109

105 Dean R. Snow, The Iroquois (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 109-111, 114115.
106 Sleeper-Smith, “Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World,” xxix.
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108 Jerome Lalemant. “Of the Condition of the Country of the Iroquois, and of Their Cruelties, 1659-1660,”
in In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives About a Native People, eds. Dean R. Snow, Charles T. Gehring,
and William A. Stama (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 132.
109 Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” 34. Quote from Francis Jennings.
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The concept of mutually dependent trade is critical to understanding why an event
such as Bacon’s Rebellion occurred in Virginia but not in the Dutch colony of New
Netherland. First, after the WIC monopoly ended, more colonists in New Netherland had
access to this lucrative trade. The opposite occurred in Virginia. While more colonists
were able to participate in the deerskin trade during the early years of frontier trading
forts, Governor Berkeley’s restrictions resulted in the ability of only a small minority of
elite colonists to engage in this market. Berkeley’s monopoly reduced participation,
while in New Netherland, accessibility to the trade increased. Moreover, Virginians were
engaged in the cultivation of tobacco, which required large tracks of Indian land. As the
natives were pushed off of their homelands and hunting grounds, tension with the English
settlers increased. Interestingly, Dutch relations with the Mahican and Munsees were
tenuous because these native groups did not have access to beaver furs and exchanged
their lands for Dutch imports. The Dutch did not engage in land sales with the Mohawk
until the 1660s, and in 1667, the colony was controlled by the English. Lastly, the arms
trade pacified Dutch-Mohawk relations because the Mohawk were engaged in combat
with other Indian groups, including the French-supported Huron. No outside European
force threatened the Chesapeake peltry trade. For reasons which are debatable yet largely
unanswered in the scholarship, English relations with the Chesapeake natives turned sore
very early in the colony’s existence. While guns were desired by the natives in Virginia
and were used to hunt furbearing animals, they were also taken up against the colonists.
Unlike the Mohawk, the Chesapeake natives did not rely on the Virginians for protection
against outside forces, including another European power. To the Virginia Indians, the
English were enemies, driving them away from their homeland and creating contentious
48

relations among native groups. While the Dutch-Mohawk relationship was a partnership,
mutually beneficial to the Dutch and Mohawk who needed each other for protection and
material goods, the English and the Algonquians were engaged in a power struggle over
lucrative skins and land.
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CONCLUSION
WHY THE PELTRY TRADE DIFFERED IN VIRGINIA AND
NEW NETHERLAND
Colonies in North America were established by the English and the Dutch to
compete with Spain and engage in a mercantilist system for the benefit of the mother
country. The seventeenth century fur trade in North America was profitable because it
was a response to a declining market in Muscovy, a result of the overhunting of
furbearing animals. The peltry trade, at least initially, was mutually beneficial to
Europeans and the Indians who made this New World market possible. In exchange for
skins and furs, the Indians of Virginia and New Netherland obtained guns and other
necessary trade goods from the Europeans. Small trinkets and beads would not satisfy
North America’s native fur traders. It is apparent from records left by Europeans
involved in the fur trade, such as William Byrd I and Isaac de Rasiere, that the Indians
were not only specific, but also demanding consumers of European products. While
scholarship has often focused on Europeans as the exploiters of subaltern groups, this
case study shows that the Indians involved in the North American peltry exchange were
just as willing to exploit Europeans to obtain choice goods. European-Indian relations
were pacific as long as the fur trade remained mutually beneficial.
Land encroachment was the antithesis of a working relationship between the
Europeans and Native Americans. While the colonists at Jamestown initially struggled to
develop a profitable economy, experimenting with various agricultural crops and
searching for natural resources, tobacco eventually became the mecca of wealth for the
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colonists who cultivated it as well as the English Crown. In contrast, the Dutch settled
New Netherland with the intent to develop a trade in beaver furs with the natives. The
economic motivation of the Dutch colony is proven by the coat of arms of New
Netherland, which features an image of the beaver.110 Virginia’s tobacco monoculture
was a primary point of contention between the English colonists and the Indians. While
the English and the Algonquians both sought a trade partnership, the cultivation of
tobacco encroached upon native lands. As the English infringed on native grounds, the
Indians likely saw their way of life disappearing, which created tension. The Indians
were involved in a struggle for survival in the Chesapeake; the English, due to their
superiority in battle, were victorious. Linda France Stine accurately suggested that
“English perceptions of the Indians oscillated from enemy (taking up land) to friend
(consuming trade goods).”111 In New Netherland, the Dutch-Indian trade revolved
around the peltry market. The exchange of beaver furs for Dutch imports did not require
the colonists to bargain for or steal Mohawk lands. New Netherland did not border
Mohawk territory, which was located further into the interior. It is worth reiterating that
the Dutch did have tenuous relations with the Mahican and the Munsees, both of whom
exchanged their lands for European wares. Land encroachment clearly contributed to
Anglo-Algonquian conflict; the absence of this infringement pacified Dutch-Mohawk
relations.
Foreign competition in the fur trade, a force beyond the colonists’ control, helped
to create a partnership between the Dutch and the Mohawk in New Netherland. This
110 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 106.
111 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 15.
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dynamic was not present in colonial Virginia. South Carolinians threatened the
profitability of the trade in deerskin in Virginia; however, the natives gladly traded with
this colony, especially after the violence of Bacon’s Rebellion. While the natives allied
with Governor Berkeley received government protection as Tributary Indians, they did
not need the Virginia colonists to protect them from an alien force, including the fur
traders in South Carolina. In comparison, the Mohawk needed Dutch arms to fight
against the French-supported Huron, whom they feared. Because the Dutch were wellaware of the threat the French and even the English in southern New England posed to
the fur trade, they ensured that the Mohawk were content in their trade dealings, as
illustrated by Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s expedition. The trade in guns and
powder to the Mohawk Indians by the Dutch seems to have strengthened their
relationship, as both groups relied on each other for protection. These mutual bonds did
not exist in Virginia, where violent conflict between the English and the Indians had been
established by 1609.
Moreover, miscegenation was more prevalent in the Dutch colony of New
Netherland than in Virginia, where it was virtually nonexistent. While interracial sex and
family formation are outside of the scope of this project, it may explain, in part, why
Dutch-Iroquois relations were generally peaceful while Anglo-Algonquian relations were
tenuous. According to Adriaen van der Donck, interracial sex was commonplace before
Dutch women arrived in the colony. Van der Donck wrote in his narrative, “.. .several
Dutchmen, before many Dutch women were to be had there, became infatuated with
them [native women]. ... [I]f they were instructed as our women are, they would no
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doubt differ little from them, if at all.”112 An Englishmen in Virginia likely viewed
Indian women in stark contrast to European females. The first recorded conjugal
relationship between an Englishmen and an Indian was John Rolfe’s marriage to
Pocahontas in 1614, which pacified Anglo-Powhatan relations for a time. It is welldocumented that French traders gained access to furs by engaging in relations with native
women, becoming part of their kinship network.113 Further studies may address this
aspect of the fur trade in Virginia and New Netherland.
By 1710, and even before this date, the fur trade in Virginia was declining.
Eventually, the colonists would surrender this trade due to competition from South
Carolina. While the fur trade continued after Bacon’s Rebellion, the Occaneechee were
no longer prominent players in this exchange. With the exception of Beverwijck, the fur
trade also declined in New Netherland. By the end of the Dutch period, the colonists
were involved in agricultural production, and by 1664, tobacco had outstripped the trade
in beaver furs as the primary export item.114 When the English officially took ownership
of the colony in 1667, the Mohawk allied with the conquerors, believing that they could
continue the mutual benefits of the fur trade with the new inhabitants. However, the
English did not protect the Mohawk from the enemy French.115 Subsequently, the

112 Van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, 75.
113 See Susan Sleeper-Smith, “Women, Kin, and Catholicism: New Perspectives on the Fur Trade,” in
Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures o f Exchange in an Atlantic World (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of
Nebraska Press, 2009).
114 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 128.
115 Snow, The Iroquois, 119.
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Mohawk had no other choice but to join with the French in the fur trade. According to
Jerome Lalemant, the Mohawk feared the French and their weapons.116
The fur trade in North America was a market of exploitation for Europeans and
Indians alike. In the case of the Dutch in New Netherland, the shared benefits of the
lucrative fur trade created a long-lasting working relationship between the Dutch and the
Mohawk. In Virginia, the trade in deerskin was marked by violence when access to the
trade was restricted during Berkeley’s governorship and the English colonists continued
to trespass onto native homelands. When the peltry trade was mutually beneficial,
meaning that Europeans and Indians obtained desired goods of equivalent value, relations
were relatively peaceful between the two groups. When this mutuality ceased to exist,
however, tension and violence was the norm. The Indians were engaged in merchant
capitalism as much as the European colonists with whom they traded their peltry.

116 Jerome Lalemant. ceNotable Embassy of the Iroquois, 1663-1664,” in In Mohawk Country: Early
Narratives About a Native People, eds. Dean R. Snow, Charles T. Gehring, and William A. Stama (New
York: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 143.
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